1. Field of the Disclosure
This disclosure generally relates to an integrated dual-device architecture for marrying modern computing devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones and tablets) with standalone tactical radios (e.g. military or first-responder push-to-talk radios).
2. General Background
After many years of development and well-publicized budget overruns, the DoD's Joint Tactical Radio System program (since reorganized and renamed) has recently given birth to a set of handheld voice and data radios, so-called Rifleman radios, built by a number of traditional military radio firms, including Exelis, GD, Harris, and Thales.
Here are some key differences between a Rifleman radio and a modern smartphone:
Rifleman RadioSmartphoneModern Graphical Interface and AppsNoYesWireless Speed1 Mbit/s100 Mbit/sApplication Microprocessor SpeedsUp to 800 MHz2+ GHzNSA Type-1 Cryptographic CertificationYesNoApproximate Per-Unit Cost$5,000$500Can Speak DoD Tactical WaveformsYesNo
Because of their scale, smartphones outpace tactical radios in processing power by a significant margin and at significantly lower production cost. Yet tactical radios require custom radio hardware and software for military environments that would never be of interest to smartphone manufacturers. Rifleman and its associated waveforms were designed strictly for a military combat environment, where robust push-to-talk voice operation is by far the highest priority.
Tactical radios typically employ specialized hardware and software radio technologies that are incompatible with modern mobile devices. For example, a smartphone may communicate over Wi-Fi or LTE networks, whereas a tactical radio may use specialized “waveforms” (such as P25 and TETRA in civil government use or Soldier Radio Waveform—SRW—in military use). Tactical radios are also focused on push-to-talk voice communications and often lack the sophisticated graphical user environment and applications found on modern mobile devices. Nevertheless, the users of tactical radios could gain significant value from leveraging such interfaces. For example, the availability of modern graphical mapping and navigational applications within a handheld tactical radio could dramatically improve warfighter effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the advent of smartphones has driven military leadership to consider how best to utilize them. Powerful graphical environments have enabled a new generation of situational awareness applications, but the mobile devices' relatively weak security and inability to communicate on resilient military networks prevent them from being used directly for tactical communications. Instead, smartphones must be tethered to rifleman radios, using the radio's USB data port for sending maps and other data, but still relying on the radio itself for voice input, encryption, and link-layer transceiving.
At an order of magnitude higher in price than a smartphone, governments do not have the budget to enable all field personnel with tactical radios. Today, tactical radio possession ends at the platoon, or at best, squad leader, leaving other team members devoid of the valuable capability.
As shown in FIG. 1, a typical tactical radio and commercial smartphone could be minimally conjoined to leverage the smartphone interfaces in a tactical environment. For example, a USB cable or other wired connector 130 could be placed between the smartphone 120 and tactical radio 110, enabling data from the smartphone to be transmitted across the tactical network. However, this approach fails to reduce size, weight, power, and cost of the tactical radio. Voice functions may be inefficiently duplicated between the two systems. Two bulky devices and the associated cabling between them encumber a user.